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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to compare two very di®erent market forms: Bazaar, the typical market present
in the Arab societies of Northern Africa and Middle East and the common retail markets existing in
modern industrial societies, such as the Mall (shopping center).
Hayek's greatest contribution in understanding the role of market was that, behind the simple ex-
change of commodities and services, he saw markets allow agents interacting to each other to transmit
relevant information on their preferences and, most of all, on the value they attach to goods according
to preferences. In Hayek's view, market is the place where participants' dispersed knowledge is shared
through the mechanism of exchange and the price system acts as a signal that coordinates such fragmented
knowledge (Hayek 1945).
However, there can be several mechanisms of exchange or many price systems, which lead to di®erent
forms of market organization. This variability is due to the existence of market institutions, which
represent the set of rules individuals share in order to ease their economic interaction and lower transaction
costs. In other words, market institutions address the problem of the coordination of participants'
dispersed information investigated by Hayek, since they shape the economic exchange mechanisms and
price systems.
Some economic works (Kranton 1996) have recently examined the interaction between exchange mech-
anisms based either on reciprocal or impersonal market relations. These works analyse the performance
of such institutions and shed light on the causes of persistence of the under-performing ones. With this
regard, the Bazaar may be considered a mix of the two systems - as price mechanism and long-standing
reciprocal relations are likely to coexist - and, according to North (1990), the Bazaar institutional frame-
work seems to coordinate the knowledge of market participants at higher transaction costs than the
elaborated institutional framework of modern markets in western societies.
Our goal is to test this assessment by considering some speci¯c institutions of the two markets and
by posing the following question: How do the mechanism of exchange and the price system shaped by
the Bazaar institutions coordinate the knowledge of market participants?
To answer this question we analyze market institutions using an Agent Based Computational Eco-
nomics (ACE) approach. The opportunity of using agent based simulation to study social phenomenon
and economics in particular is discussed by Tesfatsion (2002), Gilbert & Terna (2000), Terna (1998) and
Arthur, Durlauf & Lane (1997).
As a ¯nal remark, it is worth to stress that, because of the lack of real data concerning market
interactions , we basically deal with two idealized types of market built upon the available literature
describing the Bazaar respect to western modern markets.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a description and a theoretical analysis of the
peculiar institutions characterizing the two markets; in section 3 the ACE model is described; section 4
outlines the results of the simulations; section 5 concludes.
2 Analysis of market institutions in the Mall and the Bazaar
Why do the Bazaar of Damascus and a Mall in New York appear so di®erent?According to the anthro-
pological economic literature (Geertz 1978, Geertz 1979, Khuri 1968, Fanselow 1990) the Bazaar shows
a number of distinctive characteristics respect to the western Mall type market.In the Mall, standards of measure and weight are formalized and well de¯ned, traded goods are
homogeneous and price information is public, since shop retailers use a posted-price mechanism. This
allows buyers to know ex-ante the prices of products and to make price comparisons directly; as a
consequence, transactions are mostly impersonal. In this case, if loyalty emerges, it is unidirectional, since
it springs from having the buyers identi¯ed a certain seller who provides them the best opportunities (i.e.
lowest price) in the market and it persists until buyers do not ¯nd better opportunities in other stores.
On the contrary, in the Bazaar there are not well de¯ned and formalized standards of measure and
weight and traded goods are often not homogeneous. Price information is not public, in the sense that
retailers do not post prices of products, but show a price only when a buyer demands for the commodity.
The sellers may, consequently, o®er the same good at di®erent prices to di®erent purchasers. Transactions
are mostly interpersonal since trading involves an ongoing search for speci¯c partners, not mere o®ers of
goods to the public.
These characteristics lead to the emergence of the two most peculiar Bazaar institutions: clienteliza-
tion and bargaining. Clientelization is not simply the emergence of loyalty of some buyers for speci¯c
sellers. As in a trading relationship based on interpersonal transaction, clientship between traders is a
reciprocal matter, since it ties both the buyer and the seller, one to each other.
As clientelization, bargaining usually develops in the presence of economic interpersonal transactions.
Even if whatever is alterable is negotiable, price setting is the main objective of bargaining and traders
try to explore in depth the o®er already received, contracting along the margin of the value of the good
instead of seeking for additional o®ers from other potential partners.
Since the two markets present di®erent institutions for coordinating and aggregating the information
of market participants (Grossman & Stiglitz 1980), economic theory suggests that agents will face di®erent
information costs dealing with the existent institutional framework and this will a®ect the price dynamics.
Indeed, markets can be considered as systems where agents convey information to each other and
form their beliefs about the value of goods, expressed by their reservation prices. However, the situation
for sellers and buyers in managing such information seems to di®er: sellers are usually the information
generators of the system, being price setters, whereas buyers are often price takers, acquiring such in-
formation inside the market and forming their price beliefs according to that. The price structure for a
given commodity should re°ect the degree by which the information on the value of the good is spread
among market participants.
In the Mall, because of posted prices, buyers search extensively in the market looking for the lowest
prices and their economic problem is to balance the marginal cost of protracting the search with the
marginal bene¯t (time savings) of discovering in the next period a new lowest price (Stigler 1961). Sellers
choose which price to post and their price setting strategies are a®ected only by consumers' decision
about which shop to visit and their ability to exert the \exit" option (Hirschmann 1970). Competition
among sellers comes out indirectly from consumers' choices, given their price beliefs. If consumers are
responsive enough to changes in price opportunities, market prices will tend to the competitive e±cient
level, the lowest price every seller may o®er.
In the case of the Bazaar, the presence of bargaining makes sellers able to di®erentiate between buyers
with di®erent reservation prices. From the buyers' viewpoint, the absence of posted prices increases the
cost of acquiring and using price information in market transactions; moreover, because of clientelization,
buyers are expected to face higher information costs and are more likely locked-in to speci¯c sellers
without exploiting the opportunities of a more competitive market. The naive implication is that prices
do not approximate the unique minimum price attainable in the idealized perfect competitive market.
To test this hypothesis, we set a market model wherein, through an ACE approach, we simulate the
performance of both the Mall and Bazaar institutions through an analysis of their e®ects on market
prices.
3 Assumptions and Model's description
Since the aim of the paper is to compare the performance of di®erent markets our main concern has been
to create a model that could be used for both the Mall and the Bazaar. To do so, we have created a
general framework1 characterized by few parameters, which allows to shift from a strictly competitive
1From a technical point of view the simulation model has been realized in Java (http://www.java.sun.com) using
Swarm (http://www.swarm.org) as agent based simulation toolkit, the source code of the model is freely available at
http://bazaar-abm.sourceforge.netenvironment, like in the Mall, to a Bazaar type market; the model gives also the opportunity to explore
intermediate conditions.
We consider a ¯nite population of ns sellers and nb buyers meeting in bilateral transactions focused
on the price over a single, indivisible and not perishable good. The time is discrete and counted in ticks,
denoted by t. Each buyer may visit a seller at each tick and ask for a unit of good. A certain number of
ticks de¯ne a period T , at the end of which the agents review their beliefs and strategies.
Agents are assumed to have a low level of rationality. Dealing with rational agents would lead to a
better understanding about the e®ects of economic variables. However, this would have required strong
assumptions on the reasoning procedures and on environmental variables that can be idyosincratic to
speci¯c cultural and institutional settings and, hence, di±cult to be included in the general model devised.
In our model, agents do not follow any elaborate economic reasoning procedure: they are neither budget
constrained nor pro¯t maximizers; agents simply learn how to interact within the given institutional
framework according to an adaptive behavior. Following Kirman & Vriend (2001), the agents' adaptive
behavior is based on a learning process, which takes place through reinforcement. The agents have a
limited memory of ´ ticks.
Buyers search for the lowest price in the market. They form their price beliefs exploring the market
and recording in their memory the ¯nal price the sellers have o®ered, generating an incomplete price
distribution. This approach, similar to the one proposed by Rothschild (1974), has been simpli¯ed
assuming that from the distribution of collected prices, buyers retain informational shortcuts of the
average price p and the minimum price pmin. In particular, p is assumed to be the buyers' reservation
price, the maximum price the buyer would pay for the good.
The selection of the seller is based on the buyers' past experiences and it is a®ected by the satisfaction
the buyers have obtained from the seller's price o®ers according to a reinforcement rule. More precisely,
the selection process is based on a roulette wheel technique where the probability of visiting a particular
seller is proportional to the buyer's satisfaction for that seller. We assume that, if several buyers visit
the same seller, the seller handles them according to a \¯rst come ¯rst served" basis.
The sellers have access to an unlimited number of units of the good, which they obtain for a ¯xed
unitary cost c. Therefore, sellers' unique concern is simply to choose a price setting strategy in order
to compete with each other. As the buyers, sellers are driven by a learning process, which makes them
choose in any period the best price setting strategy according to the revenues generated in the past. The
price proposed by every seller in the market is given by the rule
pi(t) = c(t)(1 + ¹i)(1 + ºi)
where ¹i represents the markup a seller wants to obtain from the sale of one unit of commodity. The
parameter ºi represents an \unfairness" component that is added to the initial proposed price; it is speci¯c
for each seller, de¯ned at the beginning of the simulation and constant over time. The ºi parameter is the
¯rst element which di®erentiates the Bazaar from the Mall, being the unfairness component positive only
in the Bazaar, whereas ºi = 0 in the Mall. A justi¯cation for this choice could be found in the fact that,
during the bargaining, sellers may be willing to extract pro¯ts from buyers with a high willingness to pay
if the prices are not public information. In the Bazaar, this seems a widely adopted strategy by sellers
at the beginning of bargaining, as pointed out by Alexander & Alexander (1987). It is worth noting that
the price given by c(t)(1 + ¹i) represents the sellers' reservation price.
The second di®erence between the Bazaar and the Mall type market occurs when transactions take
place. Di®erently from Brenner (2002), where bargaining or posted price mechanisms emerge from agents'
behavior, we have set such a market institution exogenously. Indeed, the parameter ¯ de¯nes the length
of negotiation during a transaction. In the Mall, ¯ is set to 0 denoting impersonal transactions where the
buyers check the price proposed by the sellers and decide whether to accept or reject and leave. In the
Bazaar ¯ is positive, expressing the number of bids and counterbids the buyers and sellers may propose
to conclude the transaction. If the traders do not converge their bids in ¯ steps transaction fails.
In both cases, when the seller proposes the initial price, the buyer evaluates the o®er with the formula:
ªj(t) = (©=p) ¤ (pmin=p)
Where ªj expresses the decision of buyer j in purchasing the commodity and © is a price which ranges
between the pmin and the maximum willingness to pay p. © increases as the time without purchasing
a commodity goes on and it may be considered as a sort of dynamic reservation price that introduce a
time constraint in buyers' reasoning procedure. If ªj ¸ 1 the buyer purchases the commodity, whereasif ªj < 1 the buyer rejects the seller's price. In the Bazaar, the rejection of the seller's initial bid leads
the buyer to counter bid, so that bargaining starts, whereas in the Mall the transaction is concluded.
The bargaining process we have devised is mostly referred on the model presented by (Cassady 1968)
whose main features are: the seller bids ¯rst, bids alternate and backward moves are forbidden. The
buyer's initial countero®er is given by pmin ¢ ° where 0 < ° · 1. Such buyer's strategic initial bid
is essentially explained by the fact it may foster her bargaining power in the negotiation. Indeed, the
bargaining power of a trader in our model is a®ected by two elements: the initial price the trader proposes
and the willingness to converge towards the other trader's o®er. Hence, as far as the bargaining model
does not allow backward moves on bids it could be reasonable to assume that buyers may be willing to
increase their bargaining power by setting a ¯rst bid at a lower level than their minimum price.
Considering the agents' strategies for the convergence of prices and the ¯nal outcome of bargaining,
traditional literature on bargaining stresses the importance of time and bargaining costs on the negotiation
process (Cross 1969). Whit regard to this approach, Moulet & Rouchier (2006) deal with rational agents
maximizing expected pro¯ts and assume that the decision about carrying on the bargaining is a®ected
by bargaining costs, as the convergence to other party's price depends on the expectation of futures
opportunities. Since we keep our agents as simple as possible in order to make them act according to
very di®erent market institutions, we have neither created rational pro¯t maximizing agents nor assumed
costly time and, moreover, we have not considered feasable to appraise the buyer's transaction costs
occurring in the bargaining respect to the transaction costs of extensive search.
Hence, we have adopted a di®erent approach to shape the bargaining process: the agents' o®ered price
converges not respect to the other agents' bid, but respect to their reservation prices, that for sellers is
the price at the markup level p = c ¢ (1 + ¹i) and for the buyers is the p price. Our approach is similar
to the one developed by Brenner (2002) where sellers and buyers have to decide a set of prices they are
willing to propose or accept in the bargaining process. Whenever the sellers' price is equal or lower than
the one the buyer is willing to accept the transactions is concluded; otherwise it fails.
The formula for the convergence of price is:
p(t) = p(t ¡ 1) + (pres ¡ p(t ¡ 1)) ¤ bi where 0 < bi · 1 and i = fs;bg
The parameter pres is the reservation price and bi represents the rate of convergence either for the
seller (i = fsg) or for the buyer (i = fbg). For the seller, bs is an indicator of the buyer's loyalty to the
seller; to compute bs we consider a ratio of the seller's revenue obtained from that particular buyer and
the total seller's revenue. For the buyer, bb is equal to the value of ª already computed. The rationale for
using the same formula is that the seller's initial o®er may be relevant to a®ect the convergence strategy
of the buyer. The farther is the initial price to the buyer's price belief the smaller will be bb, denoting a
defensive convergence strategy, and vice versa.
4 Results
We study how agents learn to adapt to the di®erent market institutions in the Bazaar and the Mall and
how the institutional frameworks a®ect the price dynamics in market interactions. We run the simulations
for 5000 ticks and the results are interpreted over time. For the sake of comparability between Mall and
Bazaar, we set the majority of the parameters at the same level for the two markets in order to generate
a plausible market structure and test the sensitivity of the model to alternatives. The speci¯cation of
the more relevant common parameters is: nb = 50;T = 10;¹ 2 [0:2;0:8];c = 1000;´ = 50;° = 0:7
The two parameters di®erentiating the Mall and the Bazaar (unfairness component and length of
Bargaining) have been set respectively to º = 0 and ¯ = 0 in the Mall and º = 1 for every seller and
¯ = 10 in the Bazaar. The speci¯cation of these parameters in the Bazaar is helpful in order to study the
informational role of the existent market institutions. In particular, keeping the º equal for every seller
prevents buyers from discriminating in the ¯rst periods among less and more \fair" sellers, blurring in
the long term the dynamics yielded by the bargaining process and clientelization.
Moreover, we focus our analysis on one parameter whose speci¯cation and changes a®ect the results
of the simulations. This parameter is µ =
ns
nb
. Keeping nb = 50, we ran several simulations with ns from
5 to 50. Even if a market with a µ = 1 (meaning 1 seller for each buyer) is neither plausible nor realistic,
as it will be clearer further, it provides the most interesting insights especially for the interpretation of
the role played by Bazaar market institutions.4.1 The Mall
The results obtained in the simulation of the Mall type market are consistent with economic theory and
are to be used as a benchmark for the analysis of the results in the Bazaar. With every speci¯cation of
µ, sellers adopt quite immediately and maintain the price setting strategy with the lowest markup level
(¹ = 0:2) and ask the buyers for the minimum price (p = 1200).
Figure 1: Average price §2 ¢ ¾ for concluded transaction over time
This result is easily explained by the fact that in the ACE model sellers compete µ a la Bertrand, that is
on price. The slight di®erences with the classical Bertrand competition are that in the model buyers are
not fully informed individuals but instead learning agents who have to acquire information and update
their beliefs on price through market interactions. The responsiveness of buyers in changing their price
beliefs is a®ected both by their learning process and, most of all, by the extent to which institutions are
able to convey information about the actual lowest price in the market.
In this way, the posted price mechanism and the impersonal transactions, joint with the extensive
search in the market, are likely to conduce to buyers in any period the information about the existing
lowest price. In turn, the sellers, in order to make revenues and attract buyers, are constrained in each
period in choosing among the possible price setting strategies that lie below the actual lowest price.
Eventually, in the long-run, the set of possible price setting strategies for the sellers becomes even more
restricted until the time when every seller will consider the only pro¯table strategy as the one with
¹ = 0:2.
4.2 The Bazaar
The price dynamic in the Bazaar is strongly a®ected by µ. According to the simulations in the Bazaar
agents reach the same minimum price of the Mall type market only when µ = 1; this very unrealistic
condition deserves a detailed understanding that could provide useful insights on the di®erent logic gov-
erning the Bazaar. A trivial explanation of this result could be found in the neoclassical macroeconomic
analysis whereby, keeping the demand ¯xed (nb), an increase of the supply (ns) leads to a reduction of
the equilibrium price.
However this seems an indisputable argument, one may wonder why this happens in a market where
price information is private and the ¯nal price of transactions is a®ected by bargaining and clientelization.
During the bargaining process the traders negotiate according to their reservation prices and their
bargaining power, that is represented by bi, the convergence rate. With this regard, clientelization, if
emerges, plays a pivotal role in the ¯nal outcome of the negotiation because, during the bargaining
process, a seller facing a client is assumed to be willing to decrease quickly her bids, so that the ¯nal
price will bene¯t the buyer.
The clientelization with a speci¯c buyer is expressed by the increase of the seller's bs, which raises
as the buyer's contribution to the seller total revenue increases. It is straightforward that a \perfect
clientelization" (bs = 1) is reached ideally when the µ = 1 because with nb = ns in the market the
likelihood that each buyer establishes a unique commercial relation with only one seller is high and,








































Figure 2: Minimum price dependent on µ
This result elicits a better assessment of the meaning and role played by \perfect clientelization" in
real Bazaar markets. As Geertz (1978) pointed out for the Maroccan Suq of Sefrou, within the Bazaar
buying and selling are virtually undi®erentiated, essentially a single activity. Considering how bargaining
and clientelization have been devised in the model, when µ = 1, this is the unique case where selling
and buying are undi®erentiated, having the seller and the buyer the same bargaining power during the
negotiation. In any case, simulations where sellers can keep \perfect clientelization" relations with more
than one buyer at the same time are easily attainable slightly modifying the assumptions on bs.
Figure 3: Average price §2 ¢ ¾ for concluded transaction over time
Focusing on the price dinamyc of the Bazaar, ¯gure 3 shows both the informational virtues and
drawbacks of bargaining and clientelization. Indeed, bargaining process and clientelization lead to a
reduction of the average price over time reaching a minimum (p = 1200) at t = 2400 tick, that is the
price level attained in the Mall type market. However, for t > 2400, the price of the commodity does not
keep stable, as happened in the case of the Mal,l with the average price °uctuating, above the minimum
price.
The informational virtues of Bazaar institutions have been partly explained with the previous result.
In the ¯rst periods, buyers use a mix of extensive search (surveying competitors) and intensive search
(bargaining) to form their price beliefs and the resulting reservation prices. Similarly to the Mall, in the
¯rst stage, the mix of bargaining process and extensive search allows buyers to acquire information on
the lowest prices in the market at any period.
On the one hand, the extensive search mechanism exerted by buyers fosters competition and encour-
ages sellers to use low markup level strategies, that is to reduce their reservation price (c(t)(1+¹i)). On
the other hand, the bargaining process helps buyers in discovering sellers' reservation prices. In this way,
buyers' price beliefs and their reservation price (p) is reduced, but it hardly gets close to the minimumprice level seen in the Mall.
In order to complete the reduction of price close to the Mall price level, perfect clientelization has
to occur. Indeed, when clientelization emerges, the price set by the seller in the transactions decreases
because of the additional lessening in the seller's bids, given by the reinforcement mechanism that leads
bs to approximate to 1. At the same time, the buyer bene¯ts from his loyal behaviour with reductions in
price and goes on updating downwards her price belief until the case p = pmin = 1200.
At t = 2400, the Bazaar may be seen as a sum of reciprocal and exclusive trading relations wherein
the couple of traders is strongly locked-in. It is exactly the exclusivity of such reciprocal trading relations
that makes the traders reach a ¯nal price that is closer to the one of the Mall type market.
This situation may be described as an equilibrium of a collectively shared, self-sustaining system of
agent's beliefs (Aoki 2001) where the buyer has formed a belief on the price that is sustained as long as the
seller plays the same price setting strategy. This equilibrium yields also to the maximum bene¯ts for both
the parties, since the commodity is traded. The informational drawbacks of Bazaar institutions, beyond
t = 2400, could be interpreted as a departure from that equilibrium. If the seller chooses to \defect"
and sets a higher price setting strategy, the buyer is locked-in and hardly will shift to other vendors. In
this way, as long as the seller does not return to the previous equilibrium strategy, no transaction will be
concluded between the traders, making them loose potential opportunities of economic exchanges.
However, since our agents are not budget constrained and decide without taking into account the
potential economic losses and bene¯ts of their behaviors, the main implication of seller's defection is that
the buyer's price belief moves upwards. For the period the seller chooses a higher price setting strategy,
the locked-in buyer, even without purchasing the commodity, will register the information of increased
price and will update upwards her price belief. This allows the seller in the next periods to reduce the
price to ¯t buyer's price belief, but not necessarily at the lowest level, if buyer's price belief has increased
enough. The same could not occur in the Mall type market, where buyers are not locked-in, because they
can quickly exert the \exit" option and punish the seller's defection.
In this perspective, °uctuations of price above the minimum for t > 2400 are easily explained by the
fact that our ACE model of the Bazaar lets the sellers bene¯t from their position of price information
generators and harms the buyers, being price information takers. In any case, it is worth to note that
in the real world, sellers are not the only price information generators, as the prices set in the market
may be a®ected by external changes in the costs of production factors. The increased uncertainty for
both sellers and buyers on the value of the commodity and the resulting °uctuation of price could make
sellers more cautious in defecting from the institutional equilibrium, preferring more durable cooperative
relations with clients.
5 Conclusion
We have presented an ACE model to analyse how agents adapt their price beliefs to the mechanism
of exchange and price system within two very di®erent market institutional frameworks: the middle-
eastern Bazaar and the western Mall type market. The Mall is characterized by posted price mechanism
and impersonal transactions. In the Bazaar, where prices are not public information, bargaining and
clientelization are the most peculiar market institutions.
For the sake of comparability between the results, our approach is unusual in the sense we developed a
unique model that can simulate the two markets, with few changes in the parameters. In addtion, agents
are driven in their decision by learning process and are assumed to not follow any elaborate economic
reasoning procedure that could be idyosincratic to a speci¯c cultural and institutional environment.
In the case of the Mall, the price dynamic led to the competitive price, since the sellers competed a
la Bertrand. In the case of the Bazaar, the price dynamics prove that bargaining and clientelization may
be e®ective communicative mechanisms for coordinating information among market participants as the
Mall institutions. However, to obtain such result \perfect clientelization" between traders is required and
this happens in our simulations only when the bizarre condition of the identity between the number of
sellers and buyers in the market holds. Such condition is explained as the only one that gives sellers and
buyers the same bargaining power in the negotiation process and it highlights a deeper understanding of
"perfect clientelization" phenomena in further empirical researches.
Eventually, Bazaar institutions proved to a®ect negatively the stability of the market minimum price,
once reached. This drawback sheds light on the information costs of lock-in e®ects burdening the buyers
within stable client relations.References
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